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FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS: TOLLING
STATE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(d)
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1989 case Finley v. United States' the Supreme Court
rejected an assertion of pendent party jurisdiction but suggested that
Congress could constitutionally authorize such jurisdiction. In 1990,
Congress responded to the Court by passing 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The
statute allows the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over certain
state law claims between citizens of the same state when those claims
are properly joined with a claim over which the federal court has
original jurisdiction.2 Congress also added subsection (d) to the statute
in order to provide for situations in which the claim giving the court
original jurisdiction is dismissed Subsection (d) tolls the state statute
of limitations while the federal action is pending and for at least thirty
days after the claim is dismissed. Therefore, a party is not stripped of
a remedy in state court for a state claim simply because the federal
claim it was joined with was dismissed and the federal court has
declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.
Section 1367(d) is integral to the success of supplemental
jurisdiction. This Comment will demonstrate that § 1367(d) is a
necessary and proper regulation of federal practice and procedure and
that the Supreme Court should uphold the statute as constitutional.
Part II introduces the supplemental jurisdiction statute, discusses the
reasons for its enactment, and more specifically outlines the purpose
of § 1367(d). Part III explores the case law that interprets and
questions the constitutionality of subsection (d). Part IV further
analyzes the statute in terms of policy concerns and constitutionality.
It addresses criticisms of the statute and explains why the author feels
the statute is constitutional. In addition, this Comment will also
explain why the Supreme Court should find § 1367(d) constitutional
as applied to a private party.
1. 490 U.S. 545.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
3. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Problems with Federal Court Jurisdiction Spurring the
Adoption of§ 1367
As early as 1824 in Osborn v. Bank of the United States4 Chief
Justice John Marshall found that not all issues in an action must
depend on federal law in order for the case to arise under the laws of
the United States.5 Instead, the Supreme Court held that Article III
only requires that the cause of action contain some federal
"ingredient." 6 The Court declared that "when a question to which the
judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an
ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give
the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions
of fact or law may be involved in it."7 Osborn's whole-case approach
to federal jurisdiction gave rise to pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
Over a century after Osborn, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction when it held in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs
8
that federal jurisdiction extends to cases and controversies and not
simply to claims.9 The Court declared that, if the state and federal
claims are derived "from a common nucleus of operative fact" and the
federal issues are substantial, then "there is power in federal courts to
hear the whole."' ° Thus, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction allowed
plaintiffs tojoin a federal question claim with related state claims over
which the court had no independent subject matter jurisdiction."
Similarly, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction allowed a defendant in
federal court to assert a related claim or crossclaim orjoin a party over
which the court had no independent subject matter jurisdiction. 2
Ancillary jurisdiction was reaffirmed in Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange, 3 in which the Court found suchjurisdiction when the claim
4. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738.
5. Id. at 821-22.
6. Id. at 823.
7. Id.
8. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
9. Id. at 725.
10. Id.
I1. See generally Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909)
(developing the doctrine of pendent claim jurisdiction).
12. See generally Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450,460 (1860) (holding
that the plaintiffs could assert their claims in federal court, despite having no
independent basis for subject matterjurisdiction because theirclaim was "ancillary and
dependent ... to the original suit").
13. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
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sought to be joined arose from the same transaction as the claim giving
the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction.'
4
However, the Court did not discuss a requirement of congressional
authorization in order for the federal courts to hear pendent and
ancillary claims until Aldinger v. Howard5 and Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger.6 In these cases, in order for a federal court
to have proper jurisdiction, the Court required that Congress had not
"expressly or by implication negated" consent to hear the claims
sought to be joined with ajurisdictionally sufficient claim through the
doctrines of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction. "7 The Court once again
reiterated in Finley v. United States 8 that "'[t]he Constitution must
have given to the court the capacity to take [jurisdiction], and an act
of Congress must have supplied [the jurisdiction]. ""9 In explaining its
decision, the Court noted that what it found "of paramount importance
is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it
adopts."2 ° However, the Court also pointed out that the result of its
decision could be easily altered through congressional action.2 In
response, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which grants federal
courts statutory authority to hear most pendent and ancillary claims
that are now known as supplemental jurisdiction.22
B. The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute
The statute codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 gives the federal courts
congressional authority to hear claims that would not ordinarily be
within the courts'jurisdiction, but which can be heard if they form part
of the same "case or controversy" as a claim that is within the courts'
14. Id. at 609.
15. 427 U.S. I (1976).
16. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
17. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18; Kroger, 437 U.S. at 373 (quoting Aldinger, 427
U.S. at 18).
18. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
19. Id. at 548 (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 556.
21. Id. ("Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a
particular statute can of course be changed by Congress.").
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
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original jurisdiction.23 This authority was deemed supplemental
jurisdiction.2a
Subsection (a) of the statute formally gives the federal district
courts jurisdiction of these claims, but subsection (b) makes
exceptions to this general grant of jurisdiction in particular
circumstances in which the courts' original jurisdiction is based on
diversity jurisdiction. 5 In subsection (c) of the statute, Congress lists
instances in which a court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim it has received pursuant to subsection (a).26
Subsection (d) then ensures that a state claim will not be lost if the
federal claim is dismissed simply because the limitations period ended
while the federal action is pending. Subsection (d) states as follows:
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The subsection reads:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the
joinder or intervention of additional parties.
24. See § 1367.
25. Subsection (b) reads:
In any civil action in which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the
district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under
subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as
plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent
with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
26. Subsection (c) provides:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if-
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State
law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the
claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
1050
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The period of limitations for any claim asserted
under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the
same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same
time as or after the dismissal of the claim under
subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is
pending and for a period of 30 days after it is
dismissed unless State law provides for a longer
tolling period.
Thus, subsection (d) works to ensure that a claim, which is timely and
properly filed, is not lost simply because jurisdiction is now improper
under subsection (a). Without subsection (d), plaintiffs could not bring
supplemental state claims to federal court without fear that those
claims could be lost if the claim giving a federal court original
jurisdiction is dismissed. Therefore, without subsection (d), much of
the purpose of supplemental jurisdiction would be aggravated.
III. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF § 1367(d)
The case law discussing the tolling statute is scarce but interesting.
The only United States Supreme Court decision to interpret § 1367(d)
is Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota.27 However,
because this case was complicated by an Eleventh Amendment state
immunity defense, the question of the tolling statute's constitutionality
was left undecided.28 Shortly after Raygor, the South Carolina
Supreme Court was faced with a similar question. In Jinks v. Richland
County9 the court held that § 1367(d) is unconstitutional when applied
to the State or its political subdivisions. 3' The South Carolina
Supreme Court is the only court that has addressed the
constitutionality of§ 1367. However, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on October 21, 2002 to review the court's decision
in Jinks and will hear the case in this term.
31
A. Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota
For several years, the tolling provision of § 1367(d) went virtually
unnoticed amidst the criticism of the other provisions of the
27. 534 U.S. 533 (2002).
28. See infra Part III. A.
29. 349 S.C. 298, 563 S.E.2d 104 (2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 435 (2002).
30. Id. at 304, 563 S.E.2d at 107.
31. See 123 S. Ct. 435 (2002).
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supplemental jurisdiction statute.32 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
was faced with its first challenge to the tolling provision in 2001. In
Raygor the Court held that the tolling provision is inapplicable when
applied to claims filed in federal courts against nonconsenting states."
The plaintiffs in Raygor had raised state and federal claims against the
University of Minnesota, an arm of the state, in federal district court.34
The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss all claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of its Eleventh
Amendment immunity.35 Three weeks later, the plaintiffs refiled their
state law claims in state court.36 The defendant then moved to dismiss
them, asserting that the claims were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. 7 In addition, the defendant argued that § 1367(d) did not
apply because the federally sufficient claim was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, and, therefore, the federal court never actually
had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.3' The state court
granted the defendant's motion on these grounds and the plaintiff
appealed.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, holding
that the defendant's Eleventh Amendment defense did not strip the
federal district court of its underlying original jurisdiction and
§ 1367(d) should therefore apply to equitably toll the plaintiffs
claim. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed,4 finding that the
"application of section 1367(d) to toll the statute of limitations
applicable to state law claims against an unconsenting state defendant
first filed in federal court but then dismissed and brought in state court
is an impermissible denigration of the University's Eleventh
Amendment immunity."42
Finally, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Minnesota
Supreme Court's judgment "on the alternative ground that the tolling
provision does not apply to claims filed in federal court against
nonconsenting States." '43 The Court found that the defendant never
32. See infra note 84-85 and accompanying text.
33. 534 U.S. 533, 548 (2002).
34. Id. at 537.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 538.
37. Id. at 538.
38. Id.
39. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 538.
40. Raygor v. the Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128, 134 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
41. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Raygor, 620 N.W.2d 680, 688 (Minn.
2001).
42. Id. at 687.
43. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 536.
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consented to suit in federal court because it first raised the Eleventh
Amendment defense in its answers and also because the defendant had
not "'unequivocally expressed' a consent to be sued in federal
court."" The Court relied on the clear statement principle of statutory
construction, requiring Congress to make its intention to alter the
traditional constitutional state and federal balance "unmistakably clear
in the language of the statute."45 Thus, after finding that § 1367(d)
contained no specific legislative intent to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity, the Court found that the tolling statute simply
was not intended to apply to dismissals of claims against
nonconsenting states." Although the Court declined to directly address
whether the federal tolling of a state statute of limitations constitutes
an unconstitutional infringement on state sovereign immunity, the
Court commented "that the notion at least raises a serious
constitutional doubt."47 Justice Ginsburg wrote the concurring opinion
in which she stressed her belief "that statutes should be construed so
as to avoid difficult constitutional questions,"48 and did not believe the
Court should discuss other possible scenarios where § 1367(d) might
apply.
49
Justices Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by
Justices Breyer and Souter.5" In the dissent's view, the tolling
provision of § 1367 displayed the legitimate and important "federal
interest in the fair and efficient administration ofjustice."51 The dissent
further argued that "the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
concerns the question whether an unconsenting sovereign may be
sued, rather than when a consenting sovereign may be sued."52
Therefore, because the State had consented to be sued in its own
courts under the state statute that provided a state claim, the
application of the tolling statute does not affect the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity.53 The dissent concluded that, because the State
waived its immunity by authorizing a state claim, the tolling provision
ought to apply as it would to a private party. 54 However, because the
44. Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 541 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 546.
47. Id. at 543.
48. Id. at 549 (quoting Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S.
765, 787 (2000)).
49. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 549.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 552.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 553-54.
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majority found that the State had not waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by giving a claim and setting a statute of limitations, the
majority opinion addressed only the question of statutory construction
to find that Congress did not intend for the tolling provision to apply
to nonconsenting state defendants.
B. The South Carolina Supreme Court Decision of Jinks v.
Richland County
The Raygor Court did not directly address the constitutionality of
§ 1367(d). However, two months after Raygor, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina took up the question in Jinks v. Richland County." In
Jinks the plaintiff brought an action in federal court alleging violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as supplemental claims under the South
Carolina Tort Claims Act. 6 The district court granted summary
judgment on the § 1983 claims and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under the remaining state claims, dismissing them without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)." When the plaintiff
refiled the state claims in state court, the defendant asserted that the
claims were barred by the two year statute of limitations.58 In response,
the plaintiff asserted that the tolling provision of § 1367(d) preserved
the claims.5 9 The defendant then argued that, even if the tolling
provision of § 1367(d) applied, it nonetheless violated the Tenth
Amendment60 by infringing on South Carolina's sovereign immunity.61
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that § 1367(d) is
unconstitutional as applied to the states and their political subdivisions
in tort actions. 62 The court used a two part inquiry to analyze the
question of whether the statute violated the Tenth Amendment.63 First,
the court asked whether the Constitution gives Congress the power to
enact such a statute as one of its enumerated powers.64 The court
55. 349 S.C. 298, 563 S.E.2d 104 (2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 435 (2002).
56. Id. at 301, 563 S.E.2d at 105. The South Carolina Tort Claims Act is codi-
fied at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-10 to -200 (Law. Co-op. 2001).
57. Jinks, 349 S.C. at 301,563 S.E.2d at 105. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court in Jinks v. McCaulley, 163 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 1998).
58. Jinks, 349 S.C. at 301, 563 S.E.2d at 105.
59. Id. One should note that Raygor had not been decided when Jinks was first
heard.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving for the states and the people any powers not
expressly delegated to the federal government).
61. Jinks, 349 S.C. at 302, 563 S.E.2d at 106.
62. Id. at 304, 563 S.E.2d at 107.
63. Id. at 303, 563 S.E.2d at 106.
64. Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1997)).
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concluded that, by virtue of Article III of the United States
Constitution and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the
power to enact laws that govern the judicial power of the federal
courts, including rules of practice and procedure.65 The court then
discussed the second prong of the inquiry: whether, despite
Congress's constitutional power to regulate federal jurisdiction, the
means by which the statute regulates that jurisdiction still
"impermissibly infringe[s] upon state sovereignty."66 In determining
this question, the court discussed whether the statute was both
necessary and proper to govern the practice and procedure of the
federal courts.67 After finding that § 1367(d) is "a useful 'aid to the
exercise of federal jurisdiction,"' the court concluded that the statute
met the constitutional definition of necessary.68
However, the court found that the statute was not proper within
the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause because it "interferes
with the State's sovereign authority to establish the extent to which its
political subdivisions are subject to suit."69 The court reasoned that
states have the right to decide whether they may be sued in their own
courts as a matter of sovereignty. 7° "In addition, the State may
determine the conditions under which it consents to suit," and the
statute of limitations is one such condition.7" Therefore, the South
Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the State had consented to suit
for only a limited time through the South Carolina Tort Claims Act
and that § 1367(d) is an unconstitutional violation of the Tenth
Amendment when applied against a state or its political subdivisions
because it effectively extends the time in which a state may be sued
without the state's consent.72
C. Jinks as an Extension of Raygor
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court presumably took its
cue from the Raygor Court, the Jinks decision was actually a
significant extension of Raygor. It is true that the Raygor Court did
allude to doubts regarding the constitutionality of the tolling
provision.73 However, the majority also appeared intentionally to
65. Id. (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).
66. Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1997)).
67. Jinks, 349 S.C. at 303-04, 563 S.E.2d at 107.
68. Id. at 304, 563 S.E.2d at 107 (citation omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 305, 563 S.E.2d at 108 (citations omitted).
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 306, 563 S.E.2d at 108.
73. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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refrain from deciding the constitutionality of the statute, explicitly
expressing the limits of the holding twice in its opinion.74 In addition,
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion stressed the limits of the
holding and her belief that the Court should not "venture further into
the mist surrounding § 1367."' 7' The Court's deliberate caution and
reiteration of the limited nature of the ruling indicates that the
constitutionality of the tolling provision is far from clear. The Court's
emphasis on the limited nature of its holding may indicate that at least
some Justices would rule differently if the constitutionality of the
tolling provision was challenged by private defendants.
Raygor and Jinks can most easily be distinguished by the
reasoning used in each. In finding that the statute did not apply to
unconsenting state defendants, the Raygor Court focused on
interpreting the statute in a way that avoided the larger constitutional
question. 76 However, because of the shift in facts, the court in Jinks
could not avoid the constitutional issues and was forced to use a Tenth
Amendment analysis . As a result, though the Jinks decision extended
the judgment of Raygor, its holding was not an extension of Raygor's
reasoning. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow from Raygor that
the U.S. Supreme Court will use reasoning similar to Jinks when it
faces the question this term.
To further add to the uncertainty of how the Court will rule, three
dissenting Justices in Raygor would not find § 1367(d)
unconstitutional.78 Justice Stevens pointed to other federal tolling
statutes that also apply to state limitations periods.79 He believes the
state statutes are preempted by the Supremacy Clause8" and, though,
like any federal preemption, the tolling provision of § 1367(d) may
"'affect[] the federal balance,"' 8 it does not "'constitut[e] an
abrogation of state sovereign immunity.' "82 It naturally follows from
this reasoning that, if § 1367(d) is constitutional when applied to a
74. Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543, 547 (2002).
75. Id. at 549.
76. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
79. See Raygor, 534 U.S. at 551 n.7 (citing II U.S.C. § 108 ("tolling during
bankruptcy"); 50 U.S.C. app. § 525 ("tolling during military service"); 15 U.S.C.
§ 6606(e)(4) ("tolling during notice and remediation period for Year 2000 related
claims"); and 42 U.S.C. § 9658 ("setting uniform limitations-period commencement
date in suits under state law for damages due to hazardous release exposure")).
80. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
81. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Raygor ma-
jority at 544).
82. Id. (alteration in original).
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state defendant who had not consented to suit in federal court, then it
is also constitutional when applied to a consenting state or private -
party. Thus, it appears that Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer would
clearly find the tolling provision constitutional. The remaining six
Justices have not yet expressed a view on whether the statute is
constitutional when applied to a consenting state or private party
defendant. However, they have been overly cautious in reiterating that
the question is undecided. 3 Jinks was clearly not an extension of the
Raygor reasoning, so it does not help to clear up the uncertainty of the
constitutionality of § 1367(d). Furthermore, no court has yet attempted
to determine whether §1367(d) is constitutional when applied to a
private party defendant.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Criticisms of§ 1367(d)
The supplemental jurisdiction statute, as a whole, has been the
subject of criticism--much of it pointing out various problems,
omissions, and ambiguities.84 However, subsection (d) has not been
included in the majority of this criticism.85 Jinks was the first case to
hold the statute unconstitutional in over ten years of frequent use by
litigants and courts. Additionally, even in Jinks the statute was only
held unconstitutional as applied to political subdivisions of the state.86
One explanation for the lack of criticism of the tolling provision could
be that many states already have statutes that extend the limitations
period for claims filed in federal court and later dismissed without
prejudice and refiled in state court.87 These statutes make the tolling
provision of § 1367(d) of little consequence.
However, the attack on § 1367(d) in case law has made the scarce
scholarly criticism of the statute suddenly more pertinent. One
commentator, Brian Augustus Beckom, adamantly asserts that
83. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
84. See Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws. The
Disaster ofthe Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORYL.J. 963 (1991) (arguing
that the supplemental jurisdiction statute has created more confusion than it has
prevented); Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity:
Life After and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991)
(same).
85. Section 1367(d) was enacted in 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5113.
86. 349 S.C. 298, 304, 563 S.E. 2d 104, 107 (2002).
87. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-14 (Michie 1978) (six months); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 205(a) (McKinney 1990) (six months); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.064(a)(2) (Vernon 2002) (sixty days).
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§ 1367(d) is an unconstitutional regulation of state court practice and
procedure.8 The argument is that § 1367(d) requires a state court to
hear an otherwise stale claim by extending the period of limitations.89
However, this assertion appears invalid because if a supplemental state
claim is brought in federal court after the applicable statute of
limitations has passed, the federal court will apply the state limitations
period in accordance with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins principles.9"
In addition, § 1367(d) further serves to reaffirm a state's statute of
limitations by ensuring that a claim will not be deemed too stale to be
heard, if it is properly and timely filed in federal court and then
dismissed on grounds unrelated to the substance of the state claim.
Contrary to Beckom's argument, the provision actually protects a
state's statute of limitations. It seeks to prevent the availability of
technical manipulation that would inequitably give a defendant
immunity from a claim simply because the plaintiff first chose a
federal forum in accordance with the applicable statutory
requirements:
Furthermore, because the result is the same as if a plaintiff had
first brought the claim in state court, § 1367(d) causes the defendant
no unfair prejudice. Defendants receive notice of the claim when the
action is first brought in federal court before the limitations period has
run. Therefore, a defendant is not surprised when the action is refiled
in state court, having become fully aware of the claim since its original
filing in federal court. Thus, the purpose of statutes of limitations, to
protect "the interests in repose and avoiding stale claims,"'" is
simultaneously preserved.
A variation on the argument that the tolling provision regulates
state practice and procedure asserts that Erie principles dictate that
Congress does not have the power to determine when a state statute of
limitations period ends.9" Such an argument further argues that
§ 1367(d) does not foster uniformity and, in fact, encourages forum
shopping.93 This contention suggests that a plaintiff who chooses to
88. See Brian Augustus Beckom, Note, Pushing the Limits of the Judicial Po--
wer: Tolling State Statutes ofLimitations Under 28 U.S. C §1367(d), 77 TEX. L. REV.
1049, 1069-77 (1999).
89. See id. at 1069-71.
90. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal courts sitting in diversity must
apply state law).
91. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,736 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. Beckom, supra note 88, at 1074.
93. Id. at 1075. The commentator suggests a hypothetical in which a state claim
is dismissed on "procedural grounds" and the tolling statute is used to allow the
plaintiff to refile in state court after the statute of limitations has run. Section 1367(d)
is not used to protect state claims that are improperly brought wherever they are filed.
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bring all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence in
federal court is forum shopping because the limitations period for his
state claims may be lengthened if the claim giving the federal court
jurisdiction is dismissed.94 The federal court may choose to dismiss the
state claims, and § 1367(d) allows the plaintiff to refile them in state
court, even if the statute of limitations period has run.95 While it is true
that the limitations period is technically extended in such a situation,
this is the very way that § 1367(d) actually ensures uniformity and
discourages forum shopping. If the plaintiff had originally filed the
claim in state court, the statute of limitations issue would never arise
because there would be no reason to dismiss the state claims.
Therefore, the result would be the same for both the plaintiff and the
defendant whether the case was originally filed in state court or filed
first in federal court and later refiled in state court pursuant to
§ 1367(d). The tolling provision clearly does not deviate from the Erie
principle that precludes a federal court from giving a state-created
claim longer life than the claim would have had in state court.96
The presence of the tolling provision allows plaintiffs to have a
federal court adjudicate matters of federal jurisdiction without fear that
they may lose a state claim if their federal claim is dismissed. This is
the very reason why the tolling provision is fundamental to one of the
chief purposes of the supplemental jurisdiction statute. The tolling
statute encourages plaintiffs to bring their federal claims in federal
court by preserving their state claims, even if the federal claim is
dismissed.97 Thus, plaintiffs seeking a federal forum for federal
questions may bring all their claims in one lawsuit without fear of
losing their state claims. Without this rule, plaintiffs would be forced
to either choose the expensive and time consuming route of filing two
separate lawsuits in state and federal court or to bring all of their
If there is a procedural defect, the state claim is dismissed for reasons other than those
listed in § 1367(c) and the tolling provision would not apply. However, even if this
situation occurred and the courts interpreted § 1367(d) to apply, it still would not
encourage forum shopping because there is no motive for a plaintiff to purposely use
a procedural defect in federal court to try to get to state court. A plaintiff that wanted




96. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949)
(finding that it would be inconsistent to give a state cause of action longer life in
federal court than it would have had in state court).
97. See generally Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 817 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (finding that "[t]he purpose of th[e] tolling provision is undoubtedly to allow
claimants to pursue their federal claim in a federal court without cost to their state law
claims, should the federal claim prove unsuccessful").
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claims in state court. The average plaintiff would likely choose to
bring one suit in state court to avoid costs, so state courts would likely
become the dominant interpreters of federal law.
It is important to distinguish the above analysis from the situation
in which the statute of limitations expires during the pendency of a
diversity case that subsequently is dismissed for lack of diversity. In
this situation, § 1367(d) would not apply to toll the state statute of
limitations for any of the claims in the case. In order for § 1367(d) to
apply, the federal court must start with original subject matter
jurisdiction.98 If at any time the court finds that it never had subject
matter jurisdiction, then it must dismiss the case. If original subject
matter jurisdiction is based on diversity jurisdiction, and the court
subsequently finds that the parties lack diversity, then the federal
courts may not toll the limitations period of the claims because they
never possessed jurisdiction.99 In contrast, if original jurisdiction is
based on a federal question, the federal courts have proper subject
matter jurisdiction over the claim, even if it is eventually dismissed.
Furthermore, the courts can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
other claims arising from the same transaction or occurrence because
§ 1367 allows this when the court has original subject matter
jurisdiction."° The federal court's original subject matter jurisdiction
is fundamental to any supplemental claims. Thus, if the court never
possessed original jurisdiction, as in the diversity example, then the
court never had jurisdiction over the supplemental claims and § 1367
never applied.
The tolling provision is also important in that it seeks to minimize
confusion by allowing courts to dismiss the entire case when the
federal question has been dismissed."'0 This allows states to adjudicate
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (stating the rules for supplemental jurisdiction when the
federal court's jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (providing for supplemental jurisdiction in broad
terms to give the courts flexibility to hear an entire case).
101. See generally Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)
(holding that a federal district court may remand a case to state court, as opposed to
dismissing it, if it was originally filed in state court but removed by the defendant on
federal question grounds and the federal claims have since been dropped). Cohill was
decided prior to the supplementalj urisdiction statute's enactment, see Pub. L. No. 101-
650, 104 stat. 5113, and discussed the inequity caused when state claims are lost due
to a dismissal of federal claims in federal court after the limitations period for the state
claims has run. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 352. In addition, Cohill notes that the possibility of
losing the state claims promotes the undesirable effect of persuading plaintiffs to
decline to allege their federal claims in order to avoid possible removal and then the
possibility of losing their supplemental state claims if the claim giving federal
jurisdiction is dismissed. Id. at 352 n.9. Thus, though § 1367(d) is not limited to cases
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cases in which the issues have become solely those of state law.
Though the federal courts may technically retain jurisdiction over the
state claims even after the claim giving the court original jurisdiction
has been dismissed,"°2 the courts generally decline to exercise this
jurisdiction, particularly when the federally sufficient claim is
dismissed or voluntarily discontinued early in the proceeding.
10 3
However, without § 1367(d) it is likely that the courts would often
maintain jurisdiction over the state claims to prevent the inequity that
would occur if a plaintiff lost all of his claims merely because the
claim giving federal jurisdiction was dismissed. Not only would this
result be an inefficient use of the federal courts' time and resources,
but it would also prevent state courts from deciding cases between
non-diverse parties whose only issues are based on state law. This is
likely the reason that many states have chosen to extend the limitations
period in the identical situation by state statute.' 4
The argument against § 1367(d) that has the greatest thrust is the
idea that Congress simply exceeded its constitutional power by
enacting the provision."0 5 This argument asserts that the power to
extend state limitations periods for state claims when a district court
has declined to exercise jurisdiction over properly and timely filed
claims is not necessary and proper for Congress to regulate federal
jurisdiction." 6 If this assertion is true, then the power to extend
statutes of limitation is reserved to the states, according to the Tenth
Amendment.'0 7 One should recall that this is the reasoning applied by
the South Carolina Supreme Court in Jinks.' Though the United
that have been removed to federal court, the reasoning of Cohill applies despite the
difference in where the plaintiff originally brought the case. If this reasoning were not
used, the result would limit the plaintiffs choice of a forum for litigating a federal claim
and would allow defendants to choose federal or state court through their removal
power. As a practical matter, if the defendant does choose to remove and the federal
claims are subsequently dropped or dismissed, the case will most likely be remanded,
and the parties will continue to litigate the state claims in state court. Therefore, the
entire process yields the same result as the tolling provision provides.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (providing that "[t]he district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if... the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction") (emphasis
added).
103. See Bradenburg v. Hous. Auth. of Irvine, 253 F. 3d 891,900 (6th Cir. 2001)
(finding that "the usual course is for the district court to dismiss the state-law claims
without prejudice if all the federal claims are disposed of on summary judgment").
104. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
105. See Beckori, supra note 88, at 1069.
106. Id.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving for the states and to the people any
powers not expressly delegated to the federal government).
108. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
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States Supreme Court should use the same Tenth Amendment analysis
when faced with the question of whether § 1367(d) is unconstitutional
when applied to a private party, the remainder of this Comment will
show why the Supreme Court should reach a different decision than
the South Carolina court in Jinks.
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Should Find that § 1367(d) Is
Constitutional
It is elementary that Congress must have constitutional authority
before enacting any law. The Court has previously recognized that
Congress has the power to make laws regulating the federaljudiciary's
practice and procedure through Article III and the Necessary and
Proper Clause.'0 9 Thus, to analyze whether Congress had the power to
enact the tolling provision, the first question must be whether the
provision is necessary and proper to regulate federal practice and
procedure.
"Necessary" for constitutional purposes has been interpreted to
mean not absolutely required but merely "convenient, or useful, or
essential to another.""... Certainly, § 1367(d) is, at the very least,
convenient and useful to the regulation of federal practice because it
addresses practical concerns that the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction presents."' Even the court in Jinks conceded that the
provision "governs federal practice and procedure as it eliminates the
need for federal judges to retain supplemental claims which would be
dismissed as stale if pursued in state court" and "the tolling provision
also affects federal practice as it allows litigants to pursue actions in
federal court without giving up access to state court in the event the
federal jurisdictional basis is determined not to exist.
11 2
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that the statute
was an improper interference with a state's sovereignty when applied
to the state and its political subdivisions."13 At least one commentator
has also suggested that § 1367(d) is an improper violation of state
109. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,472 (1965) (declaring "[for the consti-
tutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and
pleading in those courts").
110. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 (1819).
111. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
112. 349 S.C. 298, 304, 563 S.E. 2d 104, 107 (2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
435 (2002) (citing Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction
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sovereignty, but such an argument is circular.114 The argument seeks
to prove that the tolling provision is an unconstitutional violation of
state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment."'5 To prove this
contention, it is argued that Congress lacks authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to make such a provision because it is an
improper violation of state sovereignty, yet such a position can not be
defended." 6 Neither Beckom nor the Supreme Court has defined
exactly where Congress's authority stops and state sovereignty begins.
State sovereignty is not violated simply because Congress regulates an
area that a state previously or currently regulates. In fact, there are
areas in which both the federal government and the states may
regulate, and, in these areas, Congress is free to preempt the state
regulations, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, when necessary.117
The Jinks court also used the doctrine of sovereign immunity to
support its holding that § 1367(d) interferes with state sovereignty."'
However, it is clear that political subdivisions are not protected in
federal court by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity." 9 In
addition, the South Carolina Tort Claims Act now provides that "the
State, its agencies, political subdivisions, and other governmental
entities are 'liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances' subject to
certain limitations," such as the statute of limitations. 2 ' It naturally
follows that neither the state nor its political subdivisions can claim
sovereign immunity if they are to be treated as private individuals
under the state's Tort Claims Act. Despite this, the Jinks court
concluded that "[§] 1367(d) potentially exposes political subdivisions
to litigation and liability after the limitations period established by the
State has expired."'' This statement is false for the same reasons that
§ 1367(d) does not expose private defendants to liability for any longer
114. Beckom, supra note 88, at 1069 (alleging that § 1367(d) "undermines many
of the central principles of state sovereignty that are contained in the Constitution and
set forth in Supreme Court decisions").
115. Jinks, 349 S.C. at 304,563 S.E. 2d at 107; Beckom, supra note 88, at 1069.
116. See id.
117. The federal and state governments have several areas in which they may
both regulate, often due to the federal government's commerce power and state
government's police power. Examples include the taxing power, as well as the areas
of commerce and education.
118. 349 S.C. at 306, 563 S.E.2d at 108.
119. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-
81 (1977) (holding that political subdivisions are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity).
120. Jinks, 349 S.C. at 306,563 S.E.2d at 108 (quoting S.C. CODEANN. § 15-78-
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than they would be subject to liability if the plaintiff had originally
filed a claim in state court.' In addition, defendants receive notice of
the impending claim at the same point of time, regardless of whether
the claim is originally filed in state court or first brought in federal
court and later refiled in state court pursuant to § 1367(d). 123 Thus, the
final result is the same whether a plaintiff originally files in state or
federal court. If claims are brought within the appropriate limitations
period, political subdivisions cannot be distinguished from private
defendants simply because claims against political subdivisions are
subject to a shorter statute of limitations.
When faced with the issue of whether § 1367(d) is constitutional
when applied to a private party, the U.S. Supreme Court should find
that Congress was within its power to enact § 1367(d) because it is
necessary and proper to Congress's power to regulate federal practice
and procedure. It is clear from the dissenting opinion in Raygor that
Justices Stephens, Breyer, and Souter will find the tolling provision
constitutional.'24 Those Justices argued in Raygor that, in order to
promote the federal interest in the fair and efficient administration of
justice, Congress may occasionally impose burdens on the state and
theirjudiciaries" 5 This power is derived from the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution. 6 If the Justices felt that § 1367(d) was a valid
exercise of this power when applied to nonconsenting state defendants,
it follows that they will find the same to be true when the statute is
applied to private parties.
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Raygor also suggests
that she will join the dissenting Justices when the constitutionality of
§ 1367(d) was questioned as applied to private defendants. 2 7 Justice
Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion to reemphasize her
reasons for joining the Court's judgment. She declined to "venture
further into the mist surrounding § 1367 '28 and agreed with the
Court's limited holding that § 1367(d) simply does not apply to
nonconsenting state defendants under the reasoning "that statutes
should be construed so as to avoid difficult constitutional
questions."' 9
122. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
125. 534 U.S. 533, 549-55 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 549-50.
127. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
128. Raygor, 533 U.S. at 549 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss4/11
CIVIL PROCEDURE
In addition to writing a separate concurring opinion in Raygor,
Justice Ginsburg has previously acted as though she will join the
dissent in Raygor when the Court is asked to decide whether § 1367(d)
is constitutional as applied to a private party. For instance, she joined
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer in a dissent to Alden v. Maine.
130
In Alden the Court found that "the immunity of a sovereign in its own
courts has always been understood to be within the sole control of the
sovereign itself."'13' The Jinks court relied on Alden for support in
concluding that states had the power to determine when the state and
its political subdivisions could be sued.'32 Justice Ginsburg will likely
disagree with the court in Jinks because she dissented in Alden.
Furthermore, it is even more likely that she will similarly disagree with
broadly extending sovereign immunity to apply to political
subdivisions of the state. Thus, it naturally follows that Justice
Ginsburg will not agree with a decision that uses the state sovereignty
doctrine to hold § 1367(d) unconstitutional.
Therefore, it seems predictable that Justices Ginsburg, Stephens,
Breyer, and Souter will uphold § 1367(d) as constitutional when
applied to private parties. Although the Raygor decision seems to
imply that the remaining Justices will agree with the Jinks court on the
theory of sovereignty, it bears reminding that the cases are easily
distinguishable. The Jinks decision dealt with political subdivisions of
the state as defendants while Raygor dealt with the actual State as a
defendant. 3 3 Similarly, the Jinks decision can be distinguished from
Raygor because the state had consented to suit in Jinks, while in
Raygor the state had never consented to suit in federal court.'34 In
addition, the decisions rested on completely different reasoning and
relied on different constitutional amendments in their holdings. 1
35
There are several reasons why at least one of the remaining five
Justices should join in upholding the constitutionality of § 1367(d).
First, the tolling provision is necessary to the efficiency of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute. Though the statute has been
criticized as poorly drafted, 136 commentators do not seem opposed to
the operation of supplemental jurisdiction.'37 This is most likely
130. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
131. Id. at 749.
132. Jinks v. Richland Co., 349 S.C. 298, 305, 563 S.E.2d 104, 107, cert. gran-
ted, 123 S. Ct. 435 (2002) (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at, 749).
133. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 548; finks, 349 S.C. at 304, 563 S.E. 2d at 106.
134. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 548; Jinks, 349 S.C. at 306, 563 S.E. 2d at 108.
135. See supra notes 43-47, 62-72 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 84.
137. See Arthur& Freer, supra note 84 (criticizing the supplemental jurisdiction
as a whole, but putting decidely less emphasis on subsection (d)).
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because the policy reasons behind the passage of the statute are still
viable today. Without supplemental jurisdiction, plaintiffs who wanted
a federal forum for federally created rights would have to bring federal
question claims separately from state law claims that arose out of the
same transaction or occurrence. This result is inefficient for both the
state and federal judiciaries. If plaintiffs instead chose to combine all
their claims in a state court action, then state courts would be forced
to be the dominant interpreters of federal questions, resulting in a lack
of uniform federal law. The inconsistent interpretations of federal laws
would be a poor reflection of the judicial system and would provide
little guidance for parties seeking to comply with those laws.
Another reason for upholding § 1367(d) is that the application of
the statute causes the states little prejudice. The state's statute of
limitations still originally determines if a claim has been timely filed.
A key purpose behind limitations periods is to protect defendants from
suits involving injuries that occurred too long ago in the past. The
tolling statute of § 1367(d) preserves this purpose and does not allow
a defendant, who has not received notice,' to be brought into court
long after he has caused an injury. The tolling provision may only be
applied when a defendant has received notice as timely, as he would
have if the claim had been originally brought in state court. 39 In
addition, the state legislatures maintain the power to decide how long
to allow the statute of limitations to be. Therefore, the impact on the
defendant and the burden imposed on the states because of § 1367(d)
is minimal.
Furthermore, if § 1367(d) is found to unconstitutionally violate
state sovereignty when applied to a private party, then there are
certainly many other federal statutes that should be quickly attacked.
There are other federal tolling statutes that apply to state limitations
periods. 4 ° If§ 13 67(d) is found to violate state sovereignty, then all of
these statutes will also be vulnerable. There are also many federal
statutes that impose burdens on the states and their judiciaries to
achieve the fair and efficient administration ofjustice. 141 These statutes
would similarly be threatened if the Court held that the tolling
provision violated state sovereignty. Thus, there are practical reasons
138. See Raygor, 534 U.S. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (declaring that "[t]he
impact of [§ 1367(d)] on the defendant is minimal, because the timely filing in federal
court provides it with the same notice as if a duplicate complaint had also been filed
in state court").
139. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
140. See Raygor, 534 U.S. at 551 n.7 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 554 nn.14-15.
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why members of the Court should uphold the constitutionality of
§ 1367(d).
In addition, using only the Tenth Amendment to strike down a
federal law has rarely been successful. 4 2 The cases that have
successfully invoked the Tenth Amendment to strike down a law have
held that Congress cannot compel a state branch of government to act
in a certain way to carry out a federal law.'43 Section 1367(d) does not
require such action by the state. The state still determines the claims
it will hear. The tolling provision simply ensures that a state claim
originally filed in federal court will have the same life that it would
have had if it had been originally filed in state court. Because the
Tenth Amendment is not usually used to strike down a federal law,
unless it is a clear invasion of state sovereignty, and because
§ 1367(d)'s interference with state law is minimal, if at all, it is
unlikely that any of the Justices will use the amendment to hold
§ 1367(d) unconstitutional. In any event, it is especially likely that at
least one of the Justices who joined in the majority opinion of Raygor
should and will join the concurring and dissenting Justices from the
opinion to gain a majority holding that § 1367(d) does not violate the
Tenth Amendment when applied to private defendants and is,
therefore, constitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 1367(d) is necessary and proper to Congress's power to
regulate the federal courts' practice and procedure. Its burden on states
is minimal, and it preserves the states' power to determine how long
a plaintiff has to bring a claim. Furthermore, it aids federal
supplemental jurisdiction and increases uniformity between state and
federal forums. Clearly, the tolling provision is not only extremely
useful, if not absolutely necessary, to modem federal practice and
procedure, but, more importantly, it is constitutional. As demonstrated,
a majority of the Supreme Court should and will likely agree.
Any result other than finding the statute constitutional when
applied to a private defendant would have serious implications on
dozens of other statutes that impose greater burdens on the states and
are less useful to exercising an enumerated power of Congress. As
with any constitutional question, the decision whether to strike a law
142. The Court expressed its reluctance to use the Tenth Amendment to strike a
law in the 1985 case, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
143. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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as unconstitutional has far greater significance than the boundaries of
that particular case. Thus, the grounds for finding § 1367(d)
constitutional are many-fold, and the bases for failing to are few.
Ruth Vanstory Horger
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